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Firewalls and VPN gateways under attack: exploited flaws at Cisco, Ivanti and Check Point

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The firewall or VPN gateway of an office sits at the edge of the network, and it can be reached from the internet. That is also why it is a target. An up-to-date device at the edge is the condition for every other protection behind it.

Right now, devices from Cisco, Ivanti and Check Point are being attacked through known flaws. The vendors have published fixed versions or advisories. This article explains what is known, which versions are named, what you can do if the update cannot happen today, and what to check afterwards. If you run such a device, find out today which version it runs, install the fixed version the vendor names and, after the update, check whether the device was compromised before.

What the CISA catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities is, and whom its deadlines bind

The US agency CISA keeps a public list of flaws that are known to be exploited, the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. CISA adds a flaw to it when there is a clear action for the affected organization to take. A listing therefore means: this flaw is being used in attacks. It does not mean that your own system has been breached. The catalog is a signal to look at your version, not a verdict on your network.

The binding deadlines come from CISA’s directive BOD 26-04. It carries forward the catalog criteria of the earlier directive BOD 22-01, which is now revoked. Under BOD 26-04, all federal civilian executive branch agencies of the USA must remediate the flaws in the catalog within prescribed timeframes. CISA calculates the due date of each entry according to its Vulnerability Response Timeline. The directive also sets expectations for when these agencies must check whether attackers compromised a system before the patch was applied.

These deadlines bind US federal agencies only. CISA states that BOD 26-04 applies only to them, but it encourages all organizations to adopt risk-based vulnerability management and to prioritize the flaws in the catalog. For a small business, these deadlines are not an obligation, but the catalog is a useful early warning.

Cisco ASA and FTD with Remote Access SSL VPN

The flaw is tracked as CVE-2026-76418. It affects the Remote Access SSL VPN service of Cisco Secure Firewall ASA software and Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) software. According to Cisco, an unauthenticated attacker can cause the device to reload unexpectedly from the network, which results in a denial of service. The cause, in Cisco’s words, is logic errors when secondary authentication is configured on a tunnel group. Cisco rates the flaw High with a CVSS base score of 8.6.

Cisco first published its advisory on 28 October 2026 and states that its PSIRT became aware of active exploitation in October 2026. CISA listed the flaw in its alert of 29 October 2026 as “Unchecked Return Value to NULL Pointer Dereference”. US federal agencies had to fix it by 1 November 2026.

Cisco names the first fixed release for each software line. For ASA, 9.16 and earlier should move to 9.16.4.104, 9.18 to 9.18.4.96, 9.20 to 9.20.4.50, 9.22 to 9.22.3.200, 9.23 to 9.23.1.48, and 9.24 to 9.24.1.27 or 9.24.10.1.

For FTD the first fixed releases are 7.0.11 for 7.0 and earlier, 7.2.13 for 7.2, 7.4.9 for 7.4, 7.6.7 for 7.6, 7.7.14 for 7.7, 10.0.3 for 10.0 and 10.1.1 for 10.1.

If you run an ASA or FTD device with remote access VPN, compare your current release with these releases.

Ivanti Connect Secure: three chained flaws, and why the first fix was not enough

Ivanti Connect Secure is a VPN gateway. Three flaws in it are being exploited, and they are described as chained, which means they are used together.

The first is CVE-2026-104935. CISA’s catalog lists it as an authentication bypass by spoofing. It has a CVSS score of 8.6 and could lead to remote command execution without authentication. According to Cyber Daily, affected are Connect Secure 25.1.1.1 and earlier, 25.1.2.2 and earlier, and 22.8R2.4 and earlier. The Center for Internet Security (MS-ISAC) states that version 22.7R2.14 and earlier is not affected. CISA added the flaw to its catalog on 13 October 2026.

On 30 October 2026 CISA added two further Connect Secure flaws, CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527. CVE-2026-111357 is a missing authentication for a critical function; it allows a local authenticated attacker to escalate privileges.

The first fix was not enough. The ASEC report names 22.8R2.5, 25.1.1.2, 25.1.3.0 and 25.1.3.1 as versions with the fix for CVE-2026-104935. According to the OpenVPN blog, however, the builds of 13 October, 25.1.1.2 and 22.8R2.5, fix only CVE-2026-104935, so devices on those builds need to upgrade again. The releases of 29 October, 25.1.1.3 and 22.8R2.6, fix all three chained flaws. If you updated to a build of 13 October, you are not done yet.

According to Kudelski Security, Ivanti’s advisory lists no known workaround.

Check Point: a flaw that is exploited, and which products are affected

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security describes CVE-2026-123039 as a local privilege escalation to root in the DynamicCLI process, through a local control socket that any user can write to. Check Point indicates that the flaw is being exploited in the wild. The description is of a local flaw, so it should not be read as an attack that works from the internet alone.

According to the Cyber Centre, several versions of these products are affected: Check Point Force Firewalls, Management and Log Servers, Multi-Domain Security Management and Multi-Domain Log Server, and Maestro Orchestrator. The Centre’s advisory is dated 12 November 2026 and was updated on 13 November 2026. According to Cybersecuritynews, Check Point Spark Firewalls and Smart-1 Cloud are not affected.

If you run a Check Point product, open the vendor’s advisory for exactly your product and compare your version there.

If the update cannot happen today, and after the update

For Cisco there is no workaround, but there is a mitigation: disable secondary authentication on any user-configured tunnel group list or on the default tunnel group DefaultWEBVPNGroup. Which command applies depends on the setup. If DefaultWEBVPNGroup does not use secondary authentication, you disable the tunnel group list in WebVPN configuration mode:

no tunnel-group-list enable

If DefaultWEBVPNGroup does use secondary authentication, you remove it with this command:

no secondary-authentication-server-group

Cisco points out that with secondary authentication disabled, the security posture of the remote access VPN is lowered. Cisco considers workarounds and mitigations temporary solutions until the upgrade to a fixed release. For Ivanti, Kudelski Security reports no known workaround in the vendor’s advisory. For Check Point, the vendor’s advisory is the place to look for what it recommends.

After the update, a second question remains: was the device already compromised before the fix? The directive for US agencies treats this as its own step. For Ivanti there is a specific warning. Volexity reports that the observed activity evades Ivanti’s Integrity Checker Tool, so a clean result does not rule out a compromise. Do not treat that tool’s result as the end of the check.

Checklist for owners

  • Find out which firewall or VPN products you run and which version each one has today.
  • Compare the version with the vendor’s advisory for your product: Cisco for ASA and FTD, Ivanti for Connect Secure, Check Point for your own product line.
  • Install the fixed version the vendor names. For Cisco, that is the first fixed release of your line. For Ivanti Connect Secure, devices on 25.1.1.2 or 22.8R2.5 need to upgrade again; 25.1.1.3 and 22.8R2.6 fix all three flaws.
  • If the update cannot happen today, apply the mitigation the vendor names and note that it is temporary. For Cisco that is the secondary-authentication change described above.
  • After the update, check whether the device was compromised before. Do not rely on a clean Ivanti Integrity Checker result alone.
  • Write down the version, the date of the change and the reason if an update is postponed, so the next check starts from facts.

How we keep track of versions and end-of-life dates

For the servers we host, we install updates automatically and monitor them; you will find this on our hosting page. To keep track of versions, end-of-life dates and known vulnerabilities we built the open-source tool Version Control. It records which version runs where, where something newer is available, when something was changed and why an update was postponed. It tracks end-of-life dates and, optionally with a Dependency-Check database, looks up known vulnerabilities of the recorded versions. An exploited vulnerability always becomes a task.

A firewall or VPN device is a component that is kept in Version Control by hand. The tool does not read deployed versions itself; they are entered in the same step as the upgrade.

Two related articles on this site: PHP2Shell and NVD mirror.

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